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Analyzing the Effectiveness of University Technology Transfer:  
Implications for Entrepreneurship Education  
 
Abstract 
  We review and synthesize the burgeoning literature on institutions and agents engaged in 
the  commercialization  of  university-based  intellectual  property.    These  studies  indicate  that 
institutional incentives and organizational practices both play an important role in enhancing the 
effectiveness of technology transfer.  We conclude that university technology transfer should be 
considered from a strategic perspective.  Institutions that choose to stress the entrepreneurial 
dimension of technology transfer need to address skill deficiencies in technology transfer offices 
(TTOs),  reward  systems  that  are  inconsistent  with  enhanced  entrepreneurial  activity,  and 
education/training for faculty members, post-docs, and graduate students relating to interactions 
with entrepreneurs.  Business schools at these universities can play a major role in addressing 
these skill and educational deficiencies, through the delivery of targeted programs to technology 
licensing officers and members of the campus community wishing to launch startup firms.   
 
JEL classification: M13 ; D24; L31; O31; O32  
 
Keywords: University technology transfer, entrepreneurship, technology transfer offices, science 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Universities  are  increasingly  being  viewed  by  policymakers  as  engines  of  economic 
growth, via the commercialization of intellectual property through technology transfer.  Indeed 
recent research suggests that many research universities have adopted formal mission statements 
regarding the role and importance of technology transfer (Markman, Phan, Balkin and Gianiodis, 
2005).  The primary commercial mechanisms of university technology transfer are licensing 
agreements, research joint ventures, and university-based startups.  Such activities can also lead 
to financial gains for the university and other non-pecuniary benefits.  As a result, many research 
institutions are searching for ways to maximize the “efficiency” of technology transfer.   
Unfortunately, formal management of an intellectual property portfolio is still a relatively 
new phenomenon for many universities.  This has led to considerable uncertainty among 
administrators regarding optimal organizational practices relating to inventor incentives, 
technology transfer “pricing,” legal issues, strategic objectives, and measurement and monitoring 
mechanisms.  We contend that the productivity of technology transfer is ultimately determined 
by the competencies of university scientists, entrepreneurs, technology transfer officers and other 
university administrators and their incentives to engage in entrepreneurial activities.  The 
purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of recent research on university technology 
transfer for entrepreneurial education, with the assumption that university administrators are 
interested in using such means to enhance their effectiveness in this arena. 
The rise in the rate of technology commercialization at universities has also attracted 
considerable attention in the academic literature.  While most authors have analyzed university 
patenting and licensing, some researchers have also assessed the entrepreneurial dimensions of 
university technology transfer.   Many authors have examined the institutions that have emerged   4 
to  facilitate  commercialization,  such  as  university  technology  transfer  offices  (henceforth, 
TTOs),  industry-university  cooperative  research  centers  (IUCRCs),  science  parks,  and 
incubators.    Other  papers  focus  more  directly  on  agents  involved  in  technology 
commercialization,  such  as  academic  scientists.    Specifically,  several  authors  examine  the 
determinants and outcomes of faculty involvement in UITT, such as their propensity to patent, 
disclose inventions, co-author with industry scientists, and form university-based startups.  These 
empirical  papers  build  on  the  theoretical  analysis  of  Jensen  and  Thursby  (2001),  who 
demonstrate that inventor involvement in UITT potentially attenuates the deleterious effects of 
informational asymmetries that naturally arise in technological diffusion from universities to 
firms.   
  In this paper, we review the burgeoning literature on institutions and agents engaged in 
the commercialization of university-based intellectual property.  These studies indicate that 
institutional incentives and organizational practices both play an important role in enhancing the 
effectiveness of technology transfer.  The evidence presented in these papers also clearly 
demonstrates the considerable heterogeneity in stakeholder objectives, perceptions, and 
outcomes relating to this activity.   
  While  the  degree  of  variation  across  institutions  makes  it  somewhat  difficult  to 
generalize, we believe that university administrators should consider technology transfer from a 
strategic perspective.  A strategic approach to technology transfer implies that such initiatives 
should  be  driven  by  long-term  goals,  provided  with  sufficient  resources  to  achieve  these 
objectives, and monitored for performance.  Institutions that choose to stress the entrepreneurial 
dimension of technology transfer need to address the following issues:   
•  Competency and skill deficiencies in many technology transfer offices (TTOs) 
•  Reward systems that are inconsistent with greater entrepreneurial activity   5 
•  Education/training for faculty members, post-docs, and graduate students in the 
specifics of the entrepreneurial process, the role of entrepreneurs, and how to 
interact with the business/entrepreneurial community.   
 
Business  schools  at  these  institutions  can  play  a  major  role  in  addressing  these  skill  and 
knowledge deficiencies, through the delivery of targeted educational programs for technology 
licensing  officers  and  members  of  the  campus  community  wishing  to  launch  startup  firms 
(Wright, Lockett, Tiratsoo, Alferoff and Mosey, 2004; Lockett and Wright, 2004).  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.  In the following section, we 
analyze the objectives and cultures of the three key stakeholders in university technology 
transfer: academic scientists, university research administrators, and firms/entrepreneurs.  This 
discussion underscores the complex, boundary-spanning role assumed by the TTO in facilitating 
technology commercialization.  Section III presents an extensive review of the literature on 
university licensing and patenting.  The next section explores the literature on an institution that 
was designed to stimulate and support entrepreneurial activities in the technology transfer 
process:  the science park.  Section V reviews studies of start-up formation at universities.  
Section VI presents lessons learned and recommendations relating to entrepreneurial education.  
II. OBJECTIVES, MOTIVES, AND CULTURES OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 
     TRANSFER STAKEHOLDERS 
 
  Following Siegel, Waldman, and Link (2003), we conjecture that the key stakeholders in 
university technology transfer are academic scientists, technology licensing officers and other 
university research administrators, and firm-based managers and entrepreneurs who 
commercialize university-based technologies.  In our process model of technology transfer, the 
technology licensing office assumes the role of a boundary spanner, filling what Burt (1992) 
terms a ‘structural hole’ to mediate the flow of resource and information within the network of 
technology transfer stakeholders (see Figure 1).  In this framework, academic scientists discover   6 
new knowledge when conducting funded research projects and thus, act as suppliers of 
innovations.  Their invention disclosures to the university constitute the critical input in the 
technology transfer process.    
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
  Note that the Bayh-Dole Act, the landmark legislation governing university technology 
transfer, stipulates that faculty members working on a federal research grant are required to 
disclose their inventions to the TTO.   However, field studies (Siegel, Waldman, and Link 
(2003a, 2003b)) and survey research (Thursby, Jensen and Thursby (2001)) indicates that many 
faculty members are not disclosing inventions to the TTO.  A failure to disclose invention 
highlights the importance of licensing officers in the TTO simply eliciting more disclosures.  
  If the faculty member decides to file an invention disclosure with the TTO, the university 
administration, in consultation with a faculty committee, must decide whether to patent the 
invention.  At this juncture, the TTO attempts to evaluate the commercial potential of the 
invention.  Given the high cost of filing and protecting patents, some institutions are reluctant to 
file for a patent if there is little interest expressed by industry in the technology.  Sometimes, 
firms or entrepreneurs have already expressed sufficient interest in the new technology to 
warrant filing a patent. 
  If a patent is granted, the university typically attempts to “market” the invention, by 
contacting firms that can potentially license the technology or entrepreneurs who are capable of 
launching a start-up firm based on the technology.  This step highlights the importance of the 
technology licensing officer’s personal networks and her knowledge of potential users of the 
technology.  Faculty members may also become directly involved in the licensing agreement as 
technical consultants or as entrepreneurs in a university spin-out.  Indeed, Jensen and Thursby   7 
(2001) outline a theoretical model, which suggests that faculty involvement in the 
commercialization of a licensed university-based technology increases the likelihood that such 
an effort will be successful.   Licensing agreements entail either upfront royalties, royalties at a 
later date, or equity in a start-up firm launched to commercialize the technology.   
  Within the context of our model (Figure 1), it is useful to reflect on the incentives 
and cultures of the three key stakeholders in university technology transfer: academic 
scientists, the TTO and university administrators, and firm/entrepreneurs.  Academic 
scientists, especially those who are untenured, seek the rapid dissemination of their ideas 
and breakthroughs.   This propagation of new knowledge is manifested along several 
dimensions, including publications in the most selective scholarly journals, presentations at 
leading conferences, and research grants.  The end result of such activity is peer 
recognition, through citations and stronger connections to the key social networks in 
academia.  Such notoriety is the hallmark of a successful career in academia.   Faculty 
members may also be seek pecuniary rewards, which can be pocketed or plowed back into 
their research to pay for laboratory equipment, graduate students, and post docs. 
  The TTO and other research administrators are also charged with the responsibility 
of protecting the university’s intellectual property portfolio.  At the same time, they are also 
charged with generating revenue from this portfolio and therefore actively seek to market 
university-based technologies to companies and entrepreneurs.  This process takes place 
within the culture of a university, which may present competing interests related to the 
democratization of ideas, considerations of internal equity, bureaucratic procedures, and 
community interests.  Some university administrators at public institutions may also 
understand that the Bayh-Dole Act embodied a desire to promote a more rapid rate of   8 
technological diffusion.  Thus, these officials may be willing to extend the use of the 
university’s technologies at a relatively low cost to firms.  
  Companies and entrepreneurs are motivated by a desire to commercialize university-
based technologies for financial gain.  They wish to secure exclusive rights to such 
technologies, since it is critical to maintain proprietary control over technologies resources 
that may constitute a source of competitive advantage.  Firms and entrepreneurs also place a 
strong emphasis on speed, in the sense that they often wish to commercialize the technology 
as soon as possible, so as to establish a “first-mover” advantage.  These agents operate in an 
entrepreneurial culture. 
  The stark disparities in the motives, perspectives, and cultures of the three key 
players in this process underscore the potential importance of organizational factors and 
institutional policies in effective university management of intellectual property.   Thus, it is 
not surprising that studies of the relative performance of university technology transfer have 
explored the importance of institutional and managerial practices.  In the following section 
of the paper, we review these papers.
  
III. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE EFFECTIVNESS OF UNIVERSITY 
LICENSING AND PATENTING  
 
Table 1 presents a review of empirical studies on the effectiveness of university 
technology transfer licensing.   Many papers have focused on the role of the TTO.  Some have 
been based on qualitative analysis of agents involved in these transfers.    
Insert Table 1 about here 
Such qualitative research has played a critical role in informing more accurate empirical 
analyses.  This point was stressed in Siegel, Waldman, Link (2003a), which was based on a   9 
combination of econometric analysis and field-based interviews.  The authors derived three key 
stylized facts from their qualitative research.  The first is that many academic scientists do not 
disclose their inventions, as required by the Bayh-Dole Act.  The authors also found that patents 
were not important for certain technologies and industries, such as computer software.  This 
result implies that invention disclosures, not patents, are the critical input in university 
technology transfer.   Their third finding was that many universities outsource legal services 
related to technology transfer, i.e., they use external lawyers to negotiate licensing agreements 
with firms.  The final result is that universities appear to have multiple strategic objectives or 
perceived “outputs” for technology transfer: licensing and the formation of start-up companies.     
  As shown on Table 1, several authors have attempted to assess the productivity of TTOs, 
using data on university technology transfer “outputs” and “inputs” (e.g., Siegel, Waldman, and 
Link (2003a), Thursby and Thursby (2002),  and Friedman and Silberman (2003)).  These papers 
highlight two key issues that arise in the context of production analysis.  The first is whether to 
employ non-parametric methods or parametric estimation procedures.  
The most popular non-parametric estimation technique is data envelopment analysis 
(DEA).  The DEA method is essentially a linear-program, which can be expressed as follows: 
                              s              m 
(1)  Max hk =  Σ  urkYrk / Σ  vikXik 
                            r=1           i=1 
subject to 
              s              m 
(2)         Σ  urkYrj / Σ  vikXij < 1; j=1,..., n 
            r=1          i=1 
            All urk > 0; vik > 0 
where  
       Y = a vector of outputs 
       X = a vector of inputs  
        i  = inputs  (m inputs) 
        r  = outputs (s outputs)   10 
        n = # of decision-making units (DMUs), or the unit of observation in a DEA study  
 
  The unit of observation in a DEA study is referred to as the decision-making unit (DMU).  
A maintained assumption of these models is that DMUs attempt to maximize efficiency.  Input-
oriented DEA yields an efficiency “score,” bounded between 0 and 1, for each DMU by 
choosing weights (ur and vi) that maximize the ratio of a linear combination of the unit's outputs 
to a linear combination of its inputs (see eq. (2)).  DEA fits a piecewise linear surface to rest on 
top of the observations, which is called the "efficient frontier."  The efficiency of each DMU is 
measured relative to all other DMUs, with the constraint that all DMU's lie on or below the 
efficient frontier.  DEA also identifies best practice DMUs, or those that are on the frontier.  All 
other DMUs are viewed as being inefficient relative to the frontier DMUs.  
  In contrast, stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) is a parametric method, developed 
independently by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977).  
SFE generates a production (or cost) frontier with a stochastic error term consisting of two 
components: a conventional random error (“white noise”) and a term that represents deviations 
from the frontier, or relative inefficiency.      
SFE is based on the assumption that the production function can be characterized as: 
 (3)     yi   = Xi β +  εi 
 
where the subscript i refers to the i
th university, y represents licensing output, X denotes a vector 
of inputs, β is the unknown parameter vector, and є is an error term that consists of two 
components, εi = (Vi − Ui), where Ui is a non-negative error term representing technical 
inefficiency, or failure to produce maximal output given the set of inputs used, and Vi is a 
symmetric error term that accounts for random effects.  Thus, we can rewrite equation (3) as:       
(4)  yi   = Xi β + Vi − Ui    11 
Following Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977), it is typical to assume that the Ui and Vi have the 
following distributions: 
                               Vi   ∼  i.i.d.  N(0, σ
2
v ) 
                               Ui   ∼  i.i.d.  N
+(0, σ
2
u ),   Ui ≥ 0     
 
That is, the inefficiency term, Ui, is assumed to have a half-normal distribution; i.e, universities 
are either “on the frontier” or below it.
1   
  SFE and DEA each have advantages and disadvantages.  The use of DEA obviates the 
need to make these assumptions and also allows for multiple output production functions.  A 
major weakness of DEA is that it is deterministic and thus, does not distinguish between 
technical inefficiency and noise.  A key benefit of SFE is that it allows hypothesis testing and the 
construction of confidence intervals.  A drawback is the need to assume a functional form for the 
production function and for the distribution of the technical efficiency term.   
  The use of SFE raises the second key issue in the context of production analysis: the 
choice of a functional form for the production function.  Most technology transfer efficiency 
studies  have  been  based  on  the  Cobb-Douglas  specification.    Link  and  Siegel  (2003)  use  a 
flexible  functional  form,  the  Translog,  which  imposes  fewer  restrictions  on  elasticities  of 
substitution than the Cobb-Douglas specification.  This can be specified as follows:   
  
                                          K                                        K          K 
 (5)   ln yi   =  Σ βk ln Xki     + ½ Σ  Σ γkl  ln Xki  ln Xli              i= 1, 2, … , N 




where y and X again denote the technology transfer output and  a vector of K technology transfer 
inputs, respectively, and i refers to the i
th university.   
                                                 
1 Some authors assume a truncated normal or exponential distribution for the inefficiency disturbance (see Sena 
(1999)).      12 
Thursby and Thursby (2002) employ DEA methods to assess whether the growth in 
licensing and patenting by universities can be attributed to an increase in the willingness of 
professors to patent, without a concomitant, fundamental change in the type of research they 
conduct.  The alternative hypothesis is that the growth in technology commercialization at 
universities reflects a shift towards more applied research.  The authors find support for the 
former hypothesis.  More specifically, they conclude that the rise in university technology 
transfer is the result of a greater willingness on the part of university researchers to patent their 
inventions, as well as an increase in outsourcing of R&D by firms via licensing.      
Siegel, Waldman, and Link (2003) use SFE to pose a different research question: why are 
some universities more effective at transferring technologies than comparable institutions?  
Specifically, they attempt to assess and “explain” the relative productivity of 113 U.S. university 
TTOs.  Contrary to conventional economic models, they found that variation in relative TTO 
performance cannot be completely explained by environmental and institutional factors.   The 
implication of this finding is that organizational practices are likely to be an important 
determinant of relative performance.   
The authors supplemented their econometric analysis with qualitative evidence, derived 
from 55 structured, in-person interviews of 100 university technology transfer stakeholders (i.e., 
academic and industry scientists, university technology managers, and corporate managers and 
entrepreneurs) at 5 research universities in Arizona and North Carolina.  The field research 
allowed them to identify intellectual property policies and organizational practices that can 
potentially enhance technology transfer performance.   
The econometric results indicate that a production function model provides a good fit.  
Based on estimates of their “marginal product,” it appears that technology licensing officers add   13 
significant value to the commercialization process.  The findings also imply that spending more 
on lawyers reduces the number of licensing agreements, but increases licensing revenue.  
Licensing revenue is subject to increasing returns, while licensing agreements are characterized 
by constant returns to scale.  An implication of increasing returns for licensing revenue is that a 
university wishing to maximize revenue should spend more on lawyers.  Perhaps this would 
enable university licensing officers to devote more time to eliciting additional invention 
disclosures and less time to negotiating with firms.   
  The  qualitative  analysis  identified  three  key  impediments  to  effective  university 
technology transfer.  The first was informational and cultural barriers between universities and 
firms,  especially  for  small  firms.    Another  impediment  was  insufficient  rewards  for  faculty 
involvement in university technology transfer.  This includes both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
rewards, such as credit towards tenure and promotion.  Some respondents even suggested that 
involvement in technology transfer might be detrimental to their career.  Finally, there appear to 
be problems with staffing and compensation practices in the TTO.  One such problem is a high 
rate of turnover among licensing officers, which is detrimental towards the establishment of 
long-term relationships with firms and entrepreneurs.  Other concerns are insufficient business 
and marketing experience in the TTO, and the possible need for incentive compensation.   
  In  a  subsequent  paper,  Link  and  Siegel  (2003)  find  that  a  particular  organizational 
practice can potentially enhance technology licensing: the “royalty distribution formula,” which 
stipulates  the  fraction  of  revenue  from  a  licensing  transaction  that  is  allocated  to  a  faculty 
member who develops the new technology.  Using data on 113 U.S. TTOs, the authors find that 
universities allocating a higher percentage of royalty payments to faculty members tend to be 
more efficient in technology transfer activities (closer to the “frontier,” in the parlance of SFE).    14 
Organizational incentives for university technology transfer appear to be important.  This finding 
was independently confirmed in Friedman and Silberman (2003) and Lach and Schankerman 
(2004), using slightly different methods and data.  
  Other authors have explored the role of organizational incentives in university technology 
transfer.    Jensen,  Thursby,  and  Thursby  (2003) model  the  process  of  faculty  disclosure  and 
university  licensing  through  a  TTO  as  a  game,  in  which  the  principal  is  the  university 
administration and the faculty and TTO are agents who maximize expected utility.  The authors 
treat the TTO as a dual agent, i.e., an agent of both the faculty and the university.  Faculty 
members must decide whether to disclose the invention to the TTO and  at what stage, i.e., 
whether to disclose at the most embryonic stage or wait until it is a lab-scale prototype.  The 
university  administration  influences  the  incentives  of  the  TTO  and  faculty  members  by 
establishing  university-wide  policies  for  the  shares  of  licensing  income  and/or  sponsored 
research.  If an invention is disclosed, the TTO decides whether to search for a firm to license the 
technology and then negotiates the terms of the licensing agreement with the licensee.  Quality is 
incorporated in their model as a determinant of the probability of successful commercialization.  
According to the authors, the TTO engages in a “balancing act,” in the sense that it can influence 
the  rate  of  invention  disclosures,  must  evaluate  the  inventions  once  they  are  disclosed,  and 
negotiate licensing agreements with firms as the agent of the administration.   
  The Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby (2003) theoretical analysis generates some interesting 
empirical predictions.  For instance, in equilibrium, the probability that a university scientist 
discloses an invention and the stage at which he or she discloses the invention is related to the 
pecuniary  reward  from  licensing,  as  well  as  faculty  quality.   The  authors  test  the  empirical 
implications  of  the  dual  agency  model  based  on  an  extensive  survey  of  the  objectives,   15 
characteristics, and outcomes of licensing activity at 62 U.S. universities.
2   Their survey results 
provide empirical support for the hypothesis that the TTO is a dual agent.  They also find that 
faculty quality is positively associated with the rate of invention disclosure at the earliest stage 
and negatively associated with the share of licensing income allocated to inventors.   
  Bercovitz,  Feldman,  Feller,  and  Burton  (2001)  examine  what  could  be  a  critical 
implementation  issue  in  university  management  of  technology  transfer:  the  organizational 
structure of the TTO and its relationship to the overall university research administration.  Based 
on the theoretical work of Alfred Chandler and Oliver Williamson, they analyze the performance 
implications  of  four  organizational  forms:  the  functional  or  unitary  form  (U-Form),  the 
multidivisional (M-form), the holding company (H-form), and the matrix form (MX-form).  The 
authors note that these structures have different implications for the ability of a university to 
coordinate activity, facilitate internal and external information flows, and align incentives in a 
manner that is consistent with its strategic goals with respect to technology transfer.  
  To test these assertions, they examine TTOs at Duke, Johns Hopkins, and Penn State and 
find evidence of alternative organizational forms at these three institutions.  They attempt to link 
these  differences  in  structure  to  variation  in  technology  transfer  performance  along  three 
dimensions:  transaction  output,  the  ability  to  coordinate  licensing  and  sponsored  research 
activities,  and  incentive  alignment  capability.    While  further  research  is  needed  to  make 
conclusive statements regarding organizational structure and performance, their findings imply 
that organizational form does matter.   
  In sum, the extant literature on TTOs suggests  that the key impediments to effective 
university technology transfer tend to be organizational in nature (Siegel, Waldman, and Link, 
2003, Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, and Link, 2003). These include the problems with differences 
                                                 
2  See Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby (2001) for an extensive description of this survey.   16 
in organizational cultures between universities and (small) firms, incentive structures including 
both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards, such as credit towards tenure and promotion, and 
staffing and compensation practices of the TTO itself.   
IV. REVIEW OF STUDIES ON THE EFFECTIVNESS OF SCIENCE PARKS  
  In recent years, there has been a substantial increase in investment in science parks and 
other property-based institutions that facilitate technology transfer.  Many universities have 
established science parks and incubators in order to foster the creation of startup firms based on 
university-owned (or licensed) technologies.  Public universities (and some private universities) 
also view these institutions as a means of fostering regional economic development.   
Insert Table 2 about here 
Science parks have become an international phenomenon. The Association of University 
Research Parks (AURP) reports that there are 123 university-based science parks in the U.S. 
(Link and Link (2003)).  The U.K. Science Park Association (UKSPA) reports that there were 32 
science parks in 1989 and 46 in 1999 (Siegel, Westhead and Wright, 2003b).  According to 
Lindelof and Loftsen (2003), there are 23 science parks in Sweden. Asia is also a major player.  
Japan leads the list with 111, China has over 100, Hong Kong and South Korea each report two 
parks, Macau, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand have one each.  India established 13 
parks in late-1980s. but with the exception of Bangalore, India's Silicon Valley, all have failed.   
This increased level of activity has stimulated an important academic debate concerning 
whether such property-based initiatives enhance the performance of corporations, universities, 
and economic regions.  More practically, it has also led to an interest among policymakers and 
industry leaders in identifying best practices.  Unfortunately, few academic studies address such 
issues.  This can be attributed to the somewhat embryonic nature of science parks and the fact   17 
that  most  science  parks  are  public-private  partnerships,  indicating  that  multiple  stakeholders 
(e.g., community groups, regional, and state governments) have enormous influence over their 
missions  and  operational  procedures.    Thus,  developing  theories  to  characterize  the  precise 
nature of their business models and managerial practices can be somewhat complex.  
Link and Scott (2003) examine the evolution and growth of U.S. science parks and their 
influence on academic missions of universities, employing econometric methods and qualitative 
analysis.  They use two data sources: a dataset constructed by the Association of University 
Related Research Parks (AURRP) containing a directory of science parks and limited 
information on their characteristics, and their own qualitative survey of provosts at 88 major 
research universities, who were asked several questions about the impact of the university’s 
involvement with science parks on various aspects of the academic mission of the university.   
Their results suggest that the existence of a formal relationship with a science park 
enables a university to generate more scholarly publications and patents and also allows them to 
more easily place Ph.D. students and hire preeminent scholars.   They also found that there 
appears to be a direct relationship between the proximity of the science park to the university and 
the probability that the academic curriculum will shift from basic toward applied research.   
  In a subsequent study (Link & Scott, 2004), the authors analyze the determinants of the 
formation of university spin-off companies within the university’s research park and report that 
university spin-off companies constitute a greater proportion of the companies in older parks and 
in those parks with richer university research environments.  The authors also find that university 
spin-off companies constitute a larger proportion of firms in parks that are located closer to their 
university and in parks that have a biotechnology focus.     18 
  The best available evidence on the effects of science parks is from the U.K. Several 
studies were based on longitudinal data consisting of performance indicators for firms located on 
science parks and a control group of firms not located on science parks (Monck, Porter, Quintas, 
Storey and Wynarczyk, 1988); Westhead and Storey, 1994; Westhead, Storey, and Cowling, 
1995).  The authors found no difference between the closure rates of firms located on science 
parks and similar firms not located on science parks (32% versus 33%), implying that sponsored 
science park environments did not significantly increase the probability of business survival or 
enhance job creation.   
With respect to the importance of the university, Westhead & Storey (1995) found a 
higher survival rate among science park firms with a university link (72%) than firms without 
such a link (53%). Westhead (1997), examining differences in R&D “outputs” (i.e., counts of 
patents, copyrights, and new products or services) and “inputs” (i.e., percentage of scientists and 
engineers in total employment, the level and intensity of R&D expenditure, and information on 
the thrust and nature of the research undertaken by the firm) of firms located on science parks 
and similar firms located off science parks, found no significant differences between science 
park and off-park firms.  
However, Siegel, Westhead & Wright (2003) found that science park firms have higher 
research productivity than comparable non-science park firms, in terms of generating new 
products and services and patents, but not copyrights.  These findings are relatively insensitive to 
the specification of the econometric model and controls for the possibility of an endogeneity 
bias.  This preliminary evidence suggests that university science parks could constitute an 
important spillover mechanism, since they appear to enhance the research productivity of firms.    19 
There have also been several evaluation studies of Swedish science parks.  Lindelof and 
Lofsten (2003, 2004) conducted a “matched pairs” analysis of 134 on-park and 139 off-park 
Swedish firms using techniques similar to those employed by Westhead and Storey (1994) and 
found that no differences between science park and non-science park firms, in terms of patenting 
and new products.  However, they report that companies located on science parks appear to have 
different strategic motivations than comparable off-park companies.  More specifically, they 
seem to place a stronger emphasis on innovative ability, sales and employment growth, market 
orientation, and profitability.  Lindelof and Lofsten (2004) also found that the absolute level of 
interaction between the university and companies located on science parks is low but that science 
park firms were more likely to have a relationship with the university than non-science park 
firms.  Considered together with other evidence presented in Ferguson and Olofsson (2004), their 
results imply that science park firms interacting with nearby universities will achieve higher 
levels of R&D output than comparable non-science park firms.   
In sum, the empirical research on these institutions suggests the importance of a 
university link in the productivity of science parks.  In part, this is because many science parks 
were created to incubate the spinouts created from university based technology.  What has been 
less clear is the exact nature of this link that contributes to the differences between park and off-
park firms.  Speculation has ranged from explanations of knowledge spillovers to the proximity 
of the requisite competencies to staff these firms.  Nonetheless, given the technological nature of 
such firms, we conjecture that there may be an important role for the technology transfer process 
in the success of the university related science parks and their business tenants.  This brings us to 
the next section of our paper, which is the empirical work related to university based spinouts.  
V. REVIEW OF STUDIES OF START-UP FORMATION AT UNIVERSITIES   20 
Although the dominant form of commercialization has traditionally been licensing, there 
is a rapid growing population of university-based entrepreneurial startup firms.  According to the 
Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM (2004)), the number of startup firms at 
U.S. universities rose from 35 in 1980 to 374 in 2003. This rise in startup activity has attracted 
considerable attention in the academic literature.  Some of these studies use the university as the 
unit of analysis, while others focus on the individual entrepreneurs. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Studies using the university as the unit of analysis typically focus on the role of university 
policies  in  stimulating  entrepreneurial  activity.    Roberts  and  Malone  (1996)  conjecture  that 
Stanford generated fewer startups than comparable institutions in the early 1990s because the 
institution refused to sign exclusive licenses to inventor-founders.   
Degroof and Roberts (2004) examine the importance of university policies relating to 
startups in regions where environmental factors (e.g., technology transfer and infrastructure for 
entrepreneurship) are not particularly conducive to entrepreneurial activity.  The authors derive a 
taxonomy  of  four  types  of  startup  policies:  an  absence  of  startup  policies,  minimal 
selectivity/support,  intermediate  selectivity/support,  and  comprehensive  selectivity/support.  
Consistent with Roberts and Malone (1996), they find that comprehensive selectivity/support   is 
the optimal policy for generating startups that can exploit venture with high growth potential.  
However, such a policy is an ideal that may not be feasible, given resource constraints.  The 
authors conclude that while spinout policies do matter, in the sense that they affect the growth 
potential of ventures, it may be more desirable to formulate such policies at a higher level of 
aggregation than the university.     21 
  DiGregorio and Shane (2003) directly assess the determinants of startup formation, using 
AUTM data from 101 universities and 530 startups.  Based on estimates of count regressions of 
the number of university-based start-ups, they conclude that the two key determinants of start-
ups are faculty quality and the ability of the university and inventor(s) to take equity in a start-up, 
in lieu of licensing royalty fees.  Interestingly, the availability of venture capital in the region 
where the university is located and the commercial orientation of the university (proxied by the 
percentage of the university’s research budget that is derived from industry) are found to have an 
insignificant impact of the rate of start-up formation.   The authors also find that a royalty 
distribution formula that is more favorable to faculty members reduces start-up formation, a 
finding that is confirmed by Markman, Phan, Balkin & Giannodis (2005).  DiGregorio and 
Shane (2003) attribute this result to the higher opportunity cost associated with launching a new 
firm, relative to licensing the technology to an existing firm.  
O’Shea, Allen, and Arnaud (2004) extend these findings in several ways.  First, they 
employ a more sophisticated econometric technique employed by Blundell, Griffith, and Van 
Reenen  (1995)  on  innovation  counts,  which  accounts  for  unobserved  heterogeneity  across 
universities due to “history and tradition.”  This type of “path dependence” would seem to be 
quite important in the university context.  Indeed, the authors find that a university’s previous 
success in technology transfer is a key explanatory factor of start-up formation.  Consistent with 
DiGregorio and Shane (2003), they also find that faculty quality, commercial capability, and the 
extent of federal science and engineering funding are also significant determinants of higher 
rates of university start-up formation.   
Franklin, Wright, and Lockett (2001) analyze perceptions at U.K. universities regarding 
entrepreneurial startups that emerge from university technology transfer.  The authors distinguish   22 
between academic and surrogate (external) entrepreneurs and “old” and “new” universities in the 
U.K.  Old universities have well established research reputations, world-class scientists, and are 
typically receptive to entrepreneurial startups.  New universities, on the other hand, tend to be 
weaker in academic research and less flexible with regard to entrepreneurial ventures. They find 
that the most significant barriers to the adoption of entrepreneurial-friendly policies are cultural 
and informational and that the universities generating the most startups (i.e., old universities) are 
those that have the most favorable policies regarding surrogate (external) entrepreneurs.  The 
authors conclude that the best approach for universities that wish to launch successful technology 
transfer  startups  is  a  combination  of  academic  and  surrogate  entrepreneurship.    This  would 
enable universities to simultaneously exploit the technical benefits of inventor involvement and 
the commercial know-how of surrogate entrepreneurs. 
  In a subsequent paper, Lockett, Wright and Franklin (2003) find that universities that 
generate the most startups have clear, well-defined strategies regarding the formation and 
management of spinouts.  These schools tend to use surrogate (external) entrepreneurs, rather 
than academic entrepreneurs, to manage this process.  It also appears as though the more 
successful universities have greater expertise and vast social networks that help them generate 
more startups.  However, the role of the academic inventor was not found to differ between the 
more and less successful universities.  Finally, equity ownership was found to be more widely 
distributed among the members of the spinout company in the case of the more successful 
universities.   
Using an extended version of the same database, Lockett and Wright (2004) assess the 
relationship  between  the  resources  and  capabilities  of  U.K.  TTOs  and  the  rate  of  start-up 
formation at their respective universities.  In doing so, the authors apply the resource-based view   23 
(RBV) of the firm to the university.  RBV asserts that an organization’s superior performance (in 
the  parlance  of  strategic  management,  its  “competitive  advantage”)  is  related  to  its  internal 
resources and capabilities.    They are  able to distinguish empirically between a university’s 
resource  inputs  and  its  routines  and  capabilities.    Based  on  estimation  of  count  regressions 
(Poisson  and  Negative  Binomial),  the  authors  conclude  that  there  is  a  positively  correlation 
between start-up formation and the university’s expenditure on intellectual property protection, 
the business development capabilities of TTOs, and the extent to which its royalty distribution 
formulae  favors  faculty  members.    These  findings  imply  that  universities  wishing  to  spawn 
numerous startups should devote greater attention to recruitment, training, and development of 
technology transfer officers with broad-based commercial skills.  We will refer back to these 
results in the following section of the paper.   
Markman,  Phan,  Balkin,  and  Giannodis  (2005)  develop  a  model  linking  university 
patents to new-firm creation in university-based incubators, with university TTOs acting as the 
intermediaries.    They  focus  on  universities  because  such  institutions  are  responsible  for  a 
substantial fraction of technology-oriented incubators in the U.S.  While there have been some 
qualitative  studies  of  university  TTO  licensing  (e.g.,  Bercovitz  Feldman,  Feller,  and  Burton 
(2001); Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, and Link (2003b); Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis 
(2001)), they have been based on data from elite research universities only (e.g., Stanford, UC 
Berkeley, and MIT) or from a small sample of more representative institutions.  These results 
may not be generalizable to the larger population of institutions that do not enjoy the same 
favorable  environmental  conditions.    To  build  a  theoretically  saturated  model  of  TTOs’ 
entrepreneurial development strategies, the authors collected qualitative and quantitative data 
from virtually the entire population of university TTOs.   24 
A surprising conclusion of Markman, Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis (2005) is that the most 
“attractive” combinations of technology stage and licensing strategy for new venture creation, 
i.e., early stage technology, combined with licensing for equity, are least likely to be favored by 
the university and thus, not likely to be used.  That is because universities and TTOs are typically 
focused on short term cash maximization, and extremely risk-averse with respect to financial and 
legal risks.  Their findings are consistent with evidence presented in Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, 
and Link (2003a, 2004), who found that TTOs appear to do a better job of serving the needs of 
large  firms  than  small,  entrepreneurial  companies.    The  results  of  these  studies  imply  that 
universities  should  modify  their  technology  transfer  strategies  if  they  are  serious  about 
promoting entrepreneurial development. 
In additional studies (Markman, Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis (2004a, 2004b), the authors 
use the same database to assess the role of incentive systems in stimulating academic 
entrepreneurship and the determinants of innovation speed, or time to market.  An interesting 
result of Markman, Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis (2004a) is that there is a positive association 
between pay to TTO personnel and both equity licensing and startup formation.  On the other 
hand, royalty payments to faculty members and their departments are uncorrelated or even 
negatively correlated with entrepreneurial activity.  This finding is consistent with DiGregorio 
and Shane (2003).   
In Markman, Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis (2004b), the authors find that speed matters, in 
the sense the faster TTOs can commercialize technologies that are protected by patents, the 
greater the returns to the university and the higher the rate of startup formation.  They also report 
that there are three key determinants of speed: TTO resources, competency in identifying 
licensees, and participation of faculty-inventors in the licensing process.    25 
  Nerkar and Shane (2003) analyze the entrepreneurial dimension of university technology 
transfer, based on an empirical analysis of 128 firms that were founded between 1980 and 1996 
to commercialize inventions owned by MIT.  They begin by noting that there is an extensive 
literature in management that suggests that new technology firms are more likely to survive if 
they exploit radical technologies (e.g, Tushman and Anderson (1986)) and if they possess patents 
with a broad scope (e.g., Merges and Nelson (1990)).  The authors conjecture that the 
relationships between radicalness and survival and scope and survival are moderated both by the 
market structure or level of concentration in the firm’s industry.  Specifically, they assert that 
radicalness and patent scope increase the probability of survival more in fragmented industries 
than in concentrated sectors.  They estimate a hazard function model using the MIT database and 
find empirical support for these hypotheses.  Thus, the effectiveness of the technology strategies 
of new firms may be dependent on industry conditions.  
Several  studies  focus  on  individual  scientists  and  entrepreneurs,  in  the  context  of 
university technology transfer.  Audretsch (2000) examines the extent to which entrepreneurs at 
universities  are  different  than  other  entrepreneurs.    He  analyzes  a  dataset  on  university  life 
scientists, in order to estimate the determinants of the probability that they will establish a new 
biotechnology firm.  Based on a hazard function analysis, including controls for the quality of 
the scientist’s research, measures or regional activity in biotechnology, and a dummy for the 
career trajectory of the scientist, the author finds that university entrepreneurs tend to be older 
and more scientifically experienced.   
There is also evidence on the importance of norms, standards, and culture in this context.  
Based on a qualitative analysis of five European universities that had outstanding performance in 
technology transfer, Clark (1998) concluded that the existence of an entrepreneurial culture at   26 
those institutions was a critical factor in their success. Roberts (1991) finds that social norms and 
MIT’s  tacit  approval  of  entrepreneurs  were  critical  determinants  of  successful  academic 
entrepreneurship at MIT.  
  Louis, Blumenthal, Gluck, and Stoto (1989) analyze the propensity of life-science faculty 
to engage in various aspects of technology transfer, including commercialization.  Their 
statistical sample consists of life scientists at the 50 research universities that received the most 
funding from the National Institutes of Health.  The authors find that the most important 
determinant of involvement in technology commercialization was local group norms.  They 
report that university policies and structures had little effect on this activity.   
  The unit of analysis in Bercovitz and Feldman (2004) is also the individual faculty 
member.  They analyze the propensity of medical school researchers at Johns Hopkins and Duke 
to file invention disclosures, a potential precursor to technology commercialization.  The authors 
find that three factors influence the decision to disclose inventions: norms at the institutions 
where the researchers were trained and the disclosure behaviors of their department chairs and 
peers, respectively. 
  The seminal papers by Lynne Zucker and Michael Darby and various collaborators 
explore the role of “star” scientists in the life sciences on the creation and location of new 
biotechnology firms in the U.S. and Japan.  In Zucker and Darby and Armstrong (2000), the 
authors assessed the impact of these university scientists on the research productivity of U.S. 
firms.  Some of these scientists resigned from the university to establish a new firm or kept their 
faculty position, but worked very closely with industry scientists.  A star scientist is defined as a 
researcher who has discovered over 40 genetic sequences, and affiliations with firms are defined 
through co-authoring between the star scientist and industry scientists.  Research productivity is   27 
measured using three proxies: number of patents granted, number of products in development, 
and number of products on the market.  They find that ties between star scientists and firm 
scientists have a positive effect on these three dimensions of research productivity, as well as 
other aspects of firm performance and rates of entry in the U.S. biotechnology industry (Zucker, 
Darby, and Armstrong (1998), Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998)). 
  In Zucker and Darby (2001), the authors examine detailed data on the outcomes of 
collaborations between “star” university scientists and biotechnology firms in Japan.  Similar 
patterns emerge, in the sense that they find that such interactions substantially enhance the 
research productivity of Japanese firms, as measured by the rate of firm patenting, product 
innovation, and market introductions of new products.  However, they also report an absence of 
geographically localized knowledge spillovers resulting from university technology transfer in 
Japan, in contrast to the U.S., where they found that such effects were strong.  The authors 
attribute this result to the following interesting institutional difference between Japan and the U.S 
in university technology transfer.  In the U.S., it is common for academic scientists to work with 
firm scientists at the firm’s laboratories.  In Japan, firm scientists typically work in the academic 
scientist’s laboratory.   Thus, according to the authors, it is not surprising that the local economic 
development impact of university technology transfer appears to be lower in Japan than in the 
U.S.     
The research on TTOs, science parks, and start-up formation summarized in Sections III, 
IV, and V underscore the importance of identifying the interests and incentives of those who 
manage the technology transfer process.  The extant literature also highlights the need to 
understand how these managers interact with key stakeholders and those who manage these   28 
stakeholders (e.g., science park and incubator managers, department chairs, and entrepreneurs) 
who are employed at these institutions.   
In the case of the university, an internal market for the efficient allocation of resources 
does not exist.  Therefore, decisions relating to technology transfer and new venture creation 
may be driven by internal bargaining, which would bring to the fore the question of incentives 
versus university mission. Theoretically, the relationship between TTO managers, the university 
administration and entrepreneurs can be modeled as a multi-level agency problem.  As in the 
case of all agency problems, the resolution can come through more complete contracts, accurate 
measurement and monitoring, or the creation of a culture of trust.  This again points to the 
importance of organizational processes and individual behaviors in providing a complete 
explanation for the link between TTOs and spinouts.   
VI. LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS  
A synthesis of the literature suggests that several issues must addressed by university 
administrators and other policymakers (e.g., regional or state authorities), in order to enhance the 
effectiveness of technology transfer.  First, universities should adopt a strategic approach to this 
activity.  Such an approach raises a set of formulation and implementation issues.   
The formulation of a technology transfer strategy entails a set of choices regarding 
institutional goals and priorities, allocation of resources to achieve these goals, technological 
emphasis, and modes of technology transfer.  The implementation of a technology transfer 
strategy requires choices regarding information flows, organizational design/structure, human 
resource management practices in the TTO, and reward systems for faculty involvement in 
technology transfer.  There are also a set of implementation issues relating to different modes of 
technology transfer, licensing, start-ups, sponsored research, and other modes that are focused   29 
more directly on stimulating economic development, such as incubators and science parks.  We 
now consider each of these in turn, in the context of the quantitative and qualitative analyses 
cited in previous sections of the paper. 
Universities must be transparent, forthright, and consistent about their strategic goals and 
priorities for technology transfer.  Such an approach will allow for more efficient matching 
between the TTO and its suppliers, the academic scientists.  Clarity and consistency of purpose is 
likely to result in more productive interactions between the TTO and university scientists, since 
TTO officers will hit fewer ‘dry wells’ and faculty members will find a more receptive audience 
for their ideas. 
Establishing priorities also relates to choices regarding technological emphasis for the 
generation of licensing opportunities, relating to stage of development and field of emphasis.  
For instance, proof-of-concept technologies are likely to be more attractive than other 
technologies if the strategic objective is licensing for cash, since it is relatively easy to compute 
economic value under this scenario.  Furthermore, such technologies can be codified for efficient 
arms-length transfer and they are more likely than other technologies to result in a commercial 
product, without substantial additional research expense.   
It is important to note that a focus on proof-of-concept technologies will require 
universities and scholars to devote more resources to incremental research, which may be less 
attractive to faculty members striving to publish in top journals.  Also, resources devoted to 
achieving proof-of-concept must be diverted from basic research or result from sponsored 
research. An alternative approach is to license nascent inventions, which will likely lead to lower 
licensing values, less immediate cash, and will require the assumption of equity shares that may   30 
prove to be worthless, but require fewer up-front resources by the university and a greater 
likelihood of faculty participation.  
University administrators and regional policymakers must also make a strategic choice 
regarding field of emphasis.  Opportunities for technology commercialization and the propensity 
of faculty members to engage in technology transfer vary substantially across fields both 
between and within the life sciences and physical sciences.  For example, many universities have 
recently launched initiatives in the life sciences and biotechnology with expectations of enhanced 
revenue and job creation through technology transfer.  
As noted earlier, the research on TTOs and licensing revenue suggests that it is difficult 
for universities to assess financial rates of returns on this activity.  We assert that in light of this 
finding, universities must develop the expertise to manage their licensing portfolio as a set of 
options, rather than individual wagers on ‘winner-take-all’ projects.  This type of portfolio 
management has implications for selection, training, and development of TTO personnel and 
other relevant stakeholders, including faculty members. 
Resource allocation decisions must also be driven by strategic choices the university 
makes regarding various modes of technology transfer.  Recall that universities can choose 
among a variety of “outputs” to emphasize, including licensing, start-ups, sponsored research 
and other mechanisms of technology transfer that are focused more directly on stimulating 
economic and regional development, such as incubators and science parks.  Licensing and 
sponsored research yield revenue, while equity from start-ups generates a long-term payoff, if 
any at all.  Universities that stress economic development outcomes are advised to focus on start-
ups, since these companies can potentially create jobs in the local region or state.  Note also that 
while a start-up strategy entails higher risk (since the probability of failure for new companies is   31 
relatively high), it also can potentially generate high returns if the start-up is taken public.  
However, a start-up strategy entails additional resources, if the university chooses to assist the 
academic entrepreneur in launching and developing their start-up.   
A strategic approach to university technology transfer should also address 
implementation issues. These refer to the organization processes and structural choices that a 
university must make in order to execute its technology transfer priorities.  Our literature review 
highlighted the importance of human resource management practices.  Several qualitative studies 
(e.g., Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, and Link (2003.)) indicate that there are deficiencies in the 
TTO, with respect to marketing skills and entrepreneurial experience.  Unfortunately, field 
research ((Markman, et al., 2004a) has also revealed TTOs are not actively recruiting individuals 
with such skills and experience.  Instead, representative institutions appear to be focusing on 
expertise in patent law and licensing or technical expertise.  Training and development programs 
for TTO personnel are advised, along with additional administrative support for this activity, 
since many TTOs lack sufficient resources and competencies to identify the most commercially 
viable inventions.   
Another conclusion that emerges from the literature review is that implementation issues 
intersect formulation issues at the point where resources are assigned.  Given the dual agency 
role assumed by technology licensing officers (Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby (2003)), a key 
resource issue is the design of incentives for TTOs to accomplish their tasks.  Research has 
shown that career paths for university technology licensing officers are limited and often of short 
duration (Markman, et al., 2004a), which implies that incentives should be directed towards 
creating immediate feedback and rewards (i.e., cash) to elicit the desired behaviors.     32 
Qualitative studies also clearly indicate that information flows between researchers and 
the TTO must be improved.  The first step is for the TTO, working in conjunction with 
university administration, to be more pro-active in eliciting invention disclosures.  Also, faculty 
members expressing an interest in forming a start-up or sourcing for sponsored research 
opportunities, information, and even training on ‘how to do it’ should be able to access such 
information from the TTO.   Given that the formation of a start-up involves activities and skills 
not typically associated with the competencies of a laboratory scientist, universities should 
utilize their business school faculty and staff to provide training and mentoring to the academic 
entrepreneur.   
The end result is an expansion of the TTO’s role as a boundary spanner to include 
managerial and “softer” business skills, in order to foster additional entrepreneurial activity at the 
university.  Successful implementation of this approach requires thinking of the technology 
transfer and entrepreneurial processes in tandem, which calls for a university level curriculum 
approach to an affirmative training and development program to encourage, support, and 
accelerate start-ups.   
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 illustrate the elements of a technological entrepreneurship curriculum that, while 
commonly encountered in business schools, can also be applied to technology transfer 
stakeholders (academic entrepreneur, TTO officer, incubator manager, and small firm licensee) 
involved in start-up formation.  Note that the curriculum is broad in scope, in terms of who 
participates in the creation and dissemination of knowledge regarding entrepreneurship, but also 
provides in-depth coverage.  Here, the continual creation of new knowledge regarding university 
start-ups resides with the faculty researcher.  Thus, incentives should be created for faculty   33 
within the university to expand their research domains to include questions related to innovation 
and entrepreneurship from technical and managerial perspectives.  Universities should also 
consider establishing a formal program that allows successful faculty entrepreneurs to serve as 
role models and mentors for faculty, students, and post-docs who wish to engage in new venture 
creation.  The implication of such an initiative is that the entrepreneurship curriculum must be 
driven from the top of the hierarchy and embedded in the institutional priorities, design 
principles and measurement systems of the university. 
According to Figure 2, the cadre of faculty conducting research on technology transfer 
and entrepreneurship (a growing number at many institutions) should also be responsible for the 
creation of entrepreneurship courses and training programs for TTO stakeholders. This closes the 
loop between knowing and doing.  A standard academic curriculum is focused on knowledge 
accumulation.  In contrast, to be immediately useful, the design principle for the training and 
educational programs we propose should be based on a process perspective, i.e., the new venture 
startup cycle, and therefore must be oriented towards overcoming problems entrepreneurs face in 
developing a successful commercial venture.  Stakeholders can acquire knowledge in the area 
they most need, based on the problems they encounter in the startup stage of the venture (e.g., 
venture capital funding), without having to take all courses.  Note that courses can be created and 
taught by any faculty from across divisions of the university with the appropriate experience or 
knowledge set.  Such a program should be managed by top-level university administrators.  
Wake Forest and RPI have created top-level administrative positions in entrepreneurship (e.g., a 
Vice Provost for Entrepreneurship), highlighting the importance of these initiatives within the 
university, and also sending an important signal to other stakeholders (e.g., faculty, donors) that 
the university places a high value on such activities.     34 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
As Figure 3 illustrates, the primary role of such a program is training on the ‘soft drivers’ 
of business venturing.  Figure 3 identifies specific courses aimed at addressing the stylized 
conclusions about entrepreneurial success from research.  For example, research has shown that 
successful entrepreneurs have cognitive routines that allow them to recover quickly from failure, 
such that the fear of failure, while always present, does not represent a hindrance to the desire to 
startup new ventures.  Research has also revealed that serial entrepreneurs are on average more 
successful, which suggests the importance of learning and knowledge accumulation of the ‘how 
to’ aspects of new venture creation.  Therefore, entrepreneurship courses designed for TTO 
stakeholders should focus both on the mechanics of starting a venture and the economic/strategic 
implications of the technologies being commercialized. Finally, for the TTO officer or 
entrepreneur who is not familiar with the specifics of the technology, technology survey courses, 
taught by faculty scientists, are recommended.    
Figure 2 and 3 suggest that the role of the institution in the implementation of a 
technology entrepreneurship curriculum is to create organizational structures such as a venture 
forum, incubator or technology park, and so on, in which technology transfer activities are given 
an institutional context and recognition.  More importantly, as the research has shown, attention 
must be paid to organizational design issues.  For example, if the university is serious about 
increase the rate of start-up activity, then the level at which transfer activities should be 
resourced and monitored from by top university administrators.  Thus, the entrepreneurship 
curriculum and its related educational program must be institutionally embedded throughout the 
university, in order to maximize its impact on the effectiveness of the technology transfer 
process.  More specifically, such initiatives cannot be primarily driven by the TTO, business or   35 
related school with an entrepreneurship program, or individual stakeholders.  Because the 
problem is multi-level in nature and involves the simultaneous actions of multiple stakeholders, 
it must be addressed from the highest strategic level of the university. Thus, specific boundary 
spanning roles must be assigned to the TTO and business school.  Such a top-down driven 
approach attenuates the possibility of role conflict and information gaps caused by the ad-hoc or 
organic design typically encountered in an academic environment. 
Decisions regarding organizational design must be accompanied by appropriate staffing 
and compensation policies, with respect to the TTO and other university staff directly 
responsible for start-ups, such as incubator and science park management.  For example, TTOs 
are advised to hire staff with a broad array of skills that cover the spectrum of the new venture 
creation cycle (Figure 3).  Additionally, preliminary research indicates that incentives matter 
because TTO officers and related stakeholders act as dual agents for the university and the 
faculty member.  Therefore, consistent with agency theory, an appropriate mechanism should be 
employed that aligns the interests of the agents with their principals, in order to elicit the optimal 
level of effort.  Incentive structures fall into two categories.  Pay for effort (behavior) or pay for 
results (productivity).  Appropriate compensation systems balance the mix of both types in order 
to encourage the appropriate efforts, especially when team effort matters, to sustain productivity 
levels for the long term.  
Appropriate incentives must also be designed for faculty members, who constitute the 
source of invention disclosures, the critical input in university technology transfer.  As discussed 
extensively, there is a natural conflict of interests generate by the traditional academic reward 
system, which is focused on peer reviewed publication of (generally) primary research, and the 
technology transfer reward system, which is focused on revenue generation from (generally)   36 
applied research.  This dilemma can only be resolved at the highest levels of the university 
administration because it is the direct result of top level priorities.  In a sense, the university can 
view the faculty member as an agent of its strategic intent.  When an agent is exposed to a 
conflict of interest generated by the conflicting goals of the principal, only the latter can resolve 
it.   
In conclusion, our review of the literature suggests that for university technology transfer 
to be productive in the creation of spinouts, the university must adopt a strategic approach to the 
commercialization of its intellectual property portfolio.  Such an approach begins with 
establishing clear priorities at the university level, combined with appropriate organization 
design choices focused on eliciting an ample supply of invention disclosures.  It also entails 
changing incentives to encourage entrepreneurial behaviors and establishing a university level 
process-based educational curriculum for all stakeholders engaged in the technology transfer 
process.    37 
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Figure 2: 
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Figure 3:  
A Phase-Model of a Technological Entrepreneurship Program for TTO Stakeholders 
 
 
 